Marathon's Richards Fears 15% Direct Loan Software Defaults

The CEO of a $23 billion asset manager says private credit is dangerously overexposed to software companies leveraged 10x, and AI is about to test every thesis that funded them.

Marathon Asset Management CEO Bruce Richards told Bloomberg Television on February 26 that default rates in software-exposed private credit could exceed 15%, calling the industry's concentration in software lending a "train coming down the tracks that you could see from some distance."1

Richards said the overall direct lending default rate could reach 5% to 6% over the next few years, but warned it will be dominated by software sector losses. He called lending to software companies at current leverage levels "not intelligent," noting many borrowers carry approximately 10x leverage in private credit portfolios.2

Key facts:

  • Software and technology companies account for roughly 25% of the private credit market through year-end 20253

  • Software represents 17% of BDC investments by deal count, second only to commercial services4

  • 23 out of 32 rated BDCs have unsecured debt maturing in 2026 totaling $12.7 billion, a 73% increase over 20254

  • UBS warns that in an aggressive AI disruption scenario, U.S. private credit defaults could climb to 13%5

  • Payment default rates in private credit have ranged from just 1-2% since 2021, but covenant defaults already reached 3.2% as of September 20253

  • Richards noted limited contagion risk to the broader market despite the software concentration1

What Alternative Business Lenders Need to Know

Why Is a $23 Billion Asset Manager Sounding the Alarm on Software Lending?

Private credit grew from roughly $800 billion in 2020 to over $3 trillion by 2025. A disproportionate share of that growth flowed into software companies. The thesis was simple: SaaS businesses generate predictable recurring revenue, have high gross margins, and benefit from customer switching costs that make cash flows durable. Private credit funds lent against those cash flows at 5x to 10x leverage, pricing in the assumption that the revenue would keep recurring.3

AI is now challenging that assumption. As Richards wrote on X following his Bloomberg interview: "While there will be many great equity investments to be made in software/AI, expect default rates to increase dramatically as AI will lead to creative destruction (positive) and destruction (negative) of software businesses."1

The concern is specific. AI tools can replicate functions that previously required dedicated SaaS subscriptions. When a $200/month/seat SaaS product can be replaced by an AI agent at a fraction of the cost, the recurring revenue that justified the lending thesis evaporates. The borrower still owes 10x leverage against cash flows that are shrinking, not growing.

How Exposed Is the Private Credit Market?

The numbers are substantial. Software and technology companies represent approximately 25% of the private credit market by value.3 In BDC portfolios specifically, software accounts for 17% of deals by count, the second-largest sector after commercial services. Roughly $40 billion, about 10% of total BDC assets, overlaps with public loan markets, with the heaviest concentration in tech.4

The stress signals are already visible. Covenant defaults reached 3.2% as of September 2025, well above the 1-2% payment default range that has held since 2021.3 Software companies account for the largest share of payment-in-kind (PIK) loans, where borrowers delay paying interest in cash. PIK arrangements are standard for fast-growing companies building revenue, but they become dangerous when a borrower's fundamentals weaken: deferred interest compounds into a credit problem quickly.

Blue Owl Capital's software lending portfolio has triggered specific investor concerns, with CNBC reporting that illiquid loans and investor redemption pressures created "another quake in private credit" on February 20.7 And UBS published research warning that in an aggressive AI disruption scenario, U.S. private credit defaults could climb to 13%, significantly higher than the stress projected for leveraged loans (8%) or high-yield bonds (4%).5

Why Does This Matter If You Are Not a Software Lender?

Because the capital that funds your warehouse lines, your credit facilities, and your investor commitments comes from the same pool. Private credit is interconnected. When a BDC takes losses on software loans, it does not selectively reduce its software exposure. It tightens credit across its entire portfolio to shore up capital ratios. If your warehouse lender or credit facility provider has significant software exposure, their stress becomes your constraint.

The maturity wall makes the timing urgent. Twenty-three out of 32 rated BDCs have unsecured debt maturing in 2026, totaling $12.7 billion, a 73% increase over 2025.4 BDCs that need to refinance maturing debt while absorbing software-sector losses will face tighter terms, higher costs, or both. That pressure rolls downhill to every borrower in their portfolio.

Richards offered a partial reassurance: he sees limited contagion risk to the broader market from software defaults. But "limited contagion" at the macro level does not mean "no impact" at the individual facility level. If your capital partner has 20% of its book in software and that segment defaults at 15%, the losses affect the partner's overall portfolio economics, including the terms it offers you.

What Can Alternative Lenders Do About This?

Map your capital providers' software exposure. Ask your warehouse lender, your BDC investor, or your credit facility provider what percentage of their portfolio is in software and technology. If they will not tell you, that is an answer. If the number exceeds 20%, stress-test what happens to your facility terms if their software book deteriorates.

Diversify your capital sources. If your lending operation depends on a single warehouse facility from a BDC with heavy software exposure, you have concentration risk. The time to secure backup facilities or alternative capital partners is before the stress hits, not during it.

Watch for tightening signals. Credit facility providers do not announce portfolio stress. They signal it through tighter advance rates, higher interest spreads, increased reporting requirements, or reduced commitment amounts at renewal. If your next facility renewal comes with materially different terms, software-sector losses may be the unstated reason.

Our Opinion

Bruce Richards is not a pessimist. Marathon manages $23 billion and has consistently deployed capital into private credit. When a manager of that scale calls lending to a sector "not intelligent," it is not a general warning about market cycles. It is a specific judgment about mispriced risk in a specific asset class.

The structural problem is straightforward. Private credit funds lent to software companies at 5x to 10x leverage against recurring revenue. AI is now capable of replacing the functions that generate that revenue. The borrowers cannot delever fast enough to match the rate at which AI is compressing their addressable market. That mismatch, between the leverage on the balance sheet and the durability of the cash flows servicing it, is what produces defaults.

For Beyond Banks readers, the relevant question is not whether software defaults will hit 15%. It is whether the capital providers who fund alternative lending operations have enough software exposure to affect their behavior. A BDC that loses 15% on its software book does not collapse. But it does become a more conservative, more expensive, and less flexible capital partner for every other borrower in its portfolio.

The alternative lending sector has an advantage here. MCA providers, equipment lenders, and factoring companies lend against tangible cash flows and physical collateral, not against projected SaaS revenue multiples. That distinction matters when capital partners are choosing where to allocate shrinking capacity. If you can demonstrate that your portfolio's performance is uncorrelated with software-sector stress, you become a more attractive borrower at exactly the moment your capital provider needs diversification most.

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