An Iowa Dealership Pledged the Same Cars to Multiple Lenders, Kept Two Sets of Books, and Walked Away With $1.4 Million. Nobody Caught It.

Stellantis sued Sky Auto Mall for $12.3 million over a "double flooring" scheme that also defrauded Ford Motor Company. Seventy-six workers lost their jobs. Stellantis posted a $24 million bond to seize the remaining inventory before a March 20 hearing, after warning that transport trucks may be arriving to remove collateral. For alternative lenders, the question is not whether this could happen in your portfolio. It is whether you would detect it before the lawsuit.

On March 5, Stellantis Financial Services sued Sky Auto Mall and Sky Chevrolet, two Eastern Iowa dealerships operated by the Tovstanovsky family (Igor, Yelena, and Alex) in Center Point and Newhall.1 The dealerships allegedly secured floor plan financing from Stellantis, then obtained identical loans from Ford Motor Company and other lenders on the same inventory.2 They maintained two sets of books:

  • one tracking the actual fraud and

  • a "distorted" version for auditors.1

After selling financed vehicles, the dealerships retained approximately $1.4 million instead of repaying Stellantis.3 Stellantis is seeking $12.3 million in repayment and has posted a $24 million bond (double the seizure value, as required by Iowa law) to seize remaining vehicles, parts, and equipment.414

In the emergency filing, Stellantis warned that owner representatives visited the lot and indicated "a transport truck may soon be arriving at the location, presumably with the intention of removing vehicle Collateral."14 Iowa WARN filings show 76 layoffs across both locations since March 6. A hearing on the seizure is scheduled for March 20.

Collateral Fraud Pattern

The Sky Auto Mall scheme follows the same mechanics as the Reagor Dykes Auto Group collapse in 2018, where a Texas dealer network ran a $50 million floor plan fraud against Ford Motor Credit, resulting in 11 criminal guilty pleas and federal prosecution.78

Reagor Dykes employees used "dummy flooring," submitting VINs of already-sold vehicles for new loans. Eight years later, the verification gaps that enabled that scheme remain open enough for a two-location Iowa dealership to exploit them.

The Mechanics of Double Flooring

"Double flooring" occurs when a dealer pledges the same vehicle as collateral to two or more floor plan lenders simultaneously. The dealer receives financing from Lender A to purchase a vehicle, then submits the same vehicle's VIN to Lender B for a second loan, collecting cash from both without either lender knowing the collateral is shared.10

In the Sky Auto Mall case, the Tovstanovskys allegedly added a second layer of concealment. They maintained two sets of financial records, one that tracked the actual fraud and one that presented a clean picture to auditors.1 They also transferred vehicles between their Center Point and Newhall locations, making it harder for any single lender's physical audit to detect the duplication.9 The dual-book system is not a casual oversight. It requires deliberate effort to fabricate a clean version of the business's financial position, distinguishing this from a dealer who simply fell behind on payments.

The Detection Gap

Floor plan lenders rely on periodic physical audits (counting vehicles on the lot against the financed inventory list), electronic VIN tracking, and financial statement reviews. The vulnerability exists in the gaps between these controls. Physical audits are typically monthly or quarterly, not continuous. A dealer with two locations can move vehicles between sites to present compliant counts to different auditors on different days. VIN tracking can detect duplication, but only if lenders share data or conduct UCC searches that reveal competing security interests.10

The FDIC specifically warns examiners to verify inter-creditor agreements when a dealer has multiple floor plan relationships. The absence of such agreements between Stellantis and Ford created the gap the Tovstanovskys exploited. Eight years after the Reagor Dykes collapse exposed identical vulnerabilities, the industry's verification infrastructure has not closed the gap. The controls exist on paper. The question is whether they are executed with sufficient frequency to catch a determined fraudster.

Stellantis filed for full repayment of $12.3 million, asset seizure, and individual liability for the Tovstanovsky family. The March 20 hearing will determine whether the court grants the emergency seizure petition.6 The Reagor Dykes precedent suggests criminal charges may follow: that case escalated from civil lawsuits to federal wire fraud conspiracy charges for 11 employees, with Rick Dykes agreeing to pay more than $58 million in restitution.7

The Direct Parallel to MCA Stacking

The mechanics of double flooring translate directly to alternative lending. Replace "vehicle" with "receivables," "equipment," or "future sales," and the scheme is identical: a borrower pledges the same collateral to multiple funders without disclosure. In the MCA industry, this is called "stacking," where a business takes multiple cash advances from different providers, each believing they have a priority position on the merchant's future receivables. The detection challenge is the same: without a centralized system to verify existing liens and obligations, each funder operates with incomplete information.

The Sky Auto Mall case is a reminder that verification is not a one-time event. The dealership was operational and passing audits while the fraud was ongoing. Detection required either continuous monitoring, cross-lender data sharing, or an audit rigorous enough to penetrate fabricated financial records.

Three Verification Failures

Three specific failures enabled the scheme:

  • No cross-lender collateral verification: Stellantis and Ford financed the same dealership without detecting shared collateral. Real-time UCC lien searches would have flagged the duplication immediately.

  • Inadequate entity-level due diligence: The Tovstanovsky family operated across two locations under related entities. A comprehensive entity status check, including formation state, registered agent, and multi-state registration history, would have mapped the interconnected operations enabling vehicle transfers.

  • Periodic rather than continuous monitoring: Monthly or quarterly audit schedules create windows during which vehicles can be moved between locations. Continuous or randomized schedules reduce this window significantly.

The Operational Response

Pre-funding: Conduct UCC lien searches on the borrower entity and all related entities. Verify entity formation state, current standing, and registered agent through Secretary of State records. Check for multi-state registrations and pending litigation.

Ongoing monitoring: Move from periodic to continuous or randomized audit schedules. For multi-location borrowers, coordinate audit timing so inventory cannot be shuffled between sites. Monitor for "sold but not paid" gaps where collateral has been liquidated but payoffs are delayed.

Structural controls: Require inter-creditor agreements when the borrower has relationships with other secured lenders. Automate UCC monitoring to receive alerts when new security interests are filed against a borrower entity. The alternative is what Stellantis now faces: a $12.3 million claim, a $24 million bond posted for emergency seizure, and no guarantee of recovery.

Our Opinion

Two of the world's largest auto manufacturers both provided floor plan financing to the same family-owned dealership group without detecting that the same vehicles were pledged to both. They had the resources, the audit teams, and the compliance frameworks. The controls existed. The execution did not.

For alternative lenders, the parallel is direct. A borrower pledges the same collateral to multiple funders. Each funder operates with incomplete information. The fraud is detectable, but only if someone checks. The checking requires real-time data: current UCC filings, current entity status, current litigation history, current ownership structures across jurisdictions.

The Reagor Dykes case established this pattern in 2018 with $50 million in losses and 11 criminal convictions. Eight years later, Sky Auto Mall replicated the scheme using the same techniques. The verification tools that would catch this on Day One, real-time UCC monitoring, automated entity verification across all 50 states, exist today. The question is whether your underwriting process uses them before funding, or discovers the gap after the lawsuit.

1-Minute Video: Kansas Has 8 Entity Statuses. Here's the One That Saves Your Team Hours.

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How does your team handle Kansas entity statuses today?

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