- Beyond Banks
- Posts
- Tricolor 29,000 Loans Pledged Twice
Tricolor 29,000 Loans Pledged Twice
Massive blind spot: consolidated recordkeeping

Tricolor's Collapse: What the Double-Pledging Fraud Reveals About Subprime Auto Lending
Dimon leveraged a potent metaphor to capture the crisis: "When you see one cockroach, there's probably more," suggesting that Tricolor’s failure is not an isolated event but rather the visible indicator of deeper, hidden systemic risk within the U.S. consumer credit market.
What Was the Immediate Cost of Exposure for Institutional Lenders?
The fallout confirms that reliance on subprime firms carries measurable and serious risk, even for the largest institutions, compelling a reevaluation of operational due diligence.
JPMorgan’s Direct Hit: JPMorgan Chase disclosed a significant $170 million impairment charge in the third quarter specifically related to loans extended to Tricolor. Dimon candidly stated the exposure was "not our finest moment," underlining the failure of internal risk controls against this particular borrower.
The Broader Banking Exposure: JPMorgan was not alone in facing substantial losses; Fifth Third Bancorp and Barclays Plc are preparing for combined losses in the hundreds of millions tied to Tricolor’s collapse. Fifth Third specifically reported a potential $200 million loss linked to "alleged fraudulent activity" at the commercial borrower.
The End of the Bull Market: Dimon’s warning arrives as he suggests the 14-year stretch of the U.S. "credit bull market" may be concluding. He views Tricolor’s bankruptcy, alongside that of auto parts supplier First Brands, as an early signal of broader credit stress, indicating that further bankruptcies are likely.
Did Tricolor’s Integrated Business Model Create a Single Point of Failure, Making Fraud Concealment Easier?
The Tricolor case delivers a severe structural warning about servicer relationships and consolidated control. Tricolor operated under a model that proved exquisitely vulnerable to internal corruption.
BHPH Model Magnified Risk: Tricolor intensified the inherent risk of the Buy Here, Pay Here (BHPH) model—where the dealer acts as both seller and financier—by also serving as the primary servicer of the loans. While the BHPH model expands credit access, this combination means control over collateral, collections, and reporting is entirely concentrated within the single institution.
Reliance on Corrupted Inputs: This integrated structure forced warehouse lenders and Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) investors to be heavily reliant on Tricolor for both originating loans and monitoring the performance data. Crucially, the collapse occurred despite the underlying collateral performance for outstanding ABS deals being "generally solid," demonstrating that fraud is impossible to underwrite against when the inputs themselves are corrupted.
Lack of Independent Verification: The core structural flaw was the lack of mandatory, independent counterbalances to Tricolor’s reporting. Tricolor’s absolute control over recordkeeping and cash flow created a massive blind spot for warehouse lenders, resulting in a crisis of trust when the firm failed.
How Did 29,000 Loans Get Double-Pledged, and What Was the Exit Strategy?
The failure was not merely due to poor underwriting in a difficult market—it was driven by alleged malfeasance of "extraordinary proportion" centered on systematic double-pledging.
The Fraudulent Mechanism: The alleged scheme involved using identical loan portfolios as collateral for separate warehouse credit lines extended by different banks. This meant Tricolor borrowed money multiple times on the same underlying vehicles.
Scale of the Breach: Initial examinations suggested "potentially systemic levels of fraud," with preliminary records indicating that at least 29,000 loans pledged to creditors were tied to vehicles already securing other debts. This level of deceit exposed massive vulnerability across all warehouse facilities.
Immediate Market Repricing: The institutional response was swift and brutal: a debt slice issued in June that had received a triple-A rating by KBRA plummeted to 78 cents on the dollar, a distressed level, demonstrating that the market adjusted rapidly once the fraud risk was priced in.
What Mandates Should Institutional Lenders Adopt to Mitigate the Next “Cockroach”?
The critical lesson is that the securitization structures fail when trust is misplaced. To prevent future systemic failures, institutional and alternative lenders must demand structural safeguards that transcend simple performance reporting.
Mandate External Verification Tools: Lenders must enforce the consistent application of multiple, layered safeguards to prevent reliance solely on originator reporting. This toolkit already exists and includes UCC lien searches to proactively prevent double pledging, and lockbox structures that channel borrower payments directly to custodial accounts.
Demand Hybrid Servicing: To mitigate the single point of failure inherent in the originator-servicer model, institutional partners must push for hybrid or backup servicing arrangements. This reduces concentrated reliance and ensures that if a firm collapses, the servicing for billions in outstanding loans can transition without complete operational chaos.
Acknowledge Heightened Consumer Stress: The fraud occurred against a backdrop of severe consumer financial pressure, which increases default risk even for legitimate loans. With average new car prices exceeding $49,000 and the typical auto loan borrower owing $5,000 more than they did in 2019, underwriting standards are stretched thin, necessitating extreme diligence in the subprime sector.
Sources:
- Nasdaq | "When You See One Cockroach, There's Probably More." Is JPMorgan Chase's Recent Hit a Warning to Other Major Banks?
- Structured FInance Association | Trust but Verify: Lessons from Tricolor
- The Autopian | ‘This Should Be A Wake Up Call.’ Americans Are Turning In Cars With Record Levels Of Debt
How Did Tricolor’s Business Model Create an Unacceptable Single Point of Failure?
For alternative business lenders, the vulnerability was structural: Tricolor integrated the roles of originator, financier, and servicer, a common feature in the Buy Here, Pay Here (BHPH) model that drastically concentrates operational risk.
Reliance on Corrupted Inputs: Tricolor intensified the BHPH risk by acting as the primary servicer, keeping all billing, collections, and crucial recordkeeping entirely in-house. This structure made warehouse lenders and ABS investors entirely dependent on Tricolor for both sourcing and monitoring performance data.
Fraud Bypassed Safeguards: The alleged fraud, described by a liquidation lawyer as "pervasive fraud" of "extraordinary proportion," proves that dishonesty at the source can render traditional oversight ineffective. Experts explicitly state that fraud is distinct from poor credit performance, meaning it cannot be successfully underwritten against when the inputs themselves are corrupted.
The Collateral Shell Game: The operational failure enabled a massive scheme where at least 29,000 loans were allegedly double-pledged—used as collateral for separate warehouse credit lines with different banks. This level of control concentration allowed the firm to systematically mislead its creditors about the exclusivity of their collateral.
When the Servicer Goes Down, Who is Responsible for the Loan Portfolio and What Does the Transition Look Like?
When a primary servicer like Tricolor—responsible for billions in outstanding liabilities—files for Chapter 7 liquidation, the transition responsibility falls immediately to the designated backup servicer.
The Designated Successor: Vervent, a San Diego firm specializing in capital markets and loan servicing, was identified as the backup servicer for Tricolor’s loans. The role of the backup servicer is to step in upon a default event to ensure the continued servicing of the loans, thereby protecting the cash flow streams promised to ABS investors and warehouse lenders.
A Non-Seamless Operational Hand-Off: Although a backup servicer was in place, the sheer operational challenge of transitioning servicing for billions in outstanding loans is far from seamless. Tricolor’s choice to liquidate (Chapter 7) rather than restructure (Chapter 11) exacerbated the chaos, removing any semblance of orderly control.
The Scale of Chaos: The transition involves verifying and taking over the management of a deeply compromised portfolio. The failure of Tricolor suggests that the underlying records themselves are suspect, forcing the backup servicer to reconcile potentially fraudulent billing, collection, and collateral data for thousands of loans. This requires significant effort to restore data integrity before reliable collections can resume.
What Operational Nightmares Keep Warehouse Lenders Awake Regarding Servicer Risk?
The immediate and profound risk for institutional warehouse lenders—who are now on the hook for significant impairment charges, such as JPMorgan’s $170 million loss—is the complete loss of control over collateral and cash flow.
Catastrophic Collateral Dispute: The paramount nightmare is the resolution of the alleged double-pledging of collateral. Multiple sophisticated financial institutions believed they had an exclusive claim to the same 29,000+ auto loans. Warehouse lenders face a brutal legal and financial struggle to establish lien priority and recover capital from assets that were promised to others.
Data Integrity and Reporting Collapse: The Tricolor situation confirms that if the originator/servicer is fraudulent, all reported data is immediately untrustworthy. Warehouse lenders cannot rely on the servicer’s historical reports to understand the true value or performance of their collateral pool, requiring costly and time-consuming independent audits or Agreed-Upon Procedures (AUPs).
The Need for Structural Enforcement: The key operational lesson for institutional lending is that the market failed to consistently enforce existing protective measures. Future operations must mandate a layered toolkit including:
UCC Lien Searches: Proactive, mandatory searches to prevent loans from being pledged to multiple creditors.
Lockbox Structures: Directing borrower payments straight into custodial accounts, removing the originator's control over cash flow and reducing theft opportunity.
Hybrid Servicing: Deliberately structuring transactions to reduce sole reliance on the originator/servicer, ensuring a viable path forward if the institution fails.
Our Opinion
The Tricolor collapse exposes a critical vulnerability that alternative business lenders and institutional warehouse partners can no longer afford to ignore: the originator-servicer model creates catastrophic single points of failure when internal controls are compromised. The $170 million JPMorgan charge and Fifth Third's $200 million loss tied to 29,000 double-pledged loans prove that sophisticated institutions failed to implement basic verification protocols.
Alternative lenders should immediately audit their warehouse relationships against three non-negotiable controls. First, mandate regular UCC lien searches to verify collateral exclusivity before advancing additional capital. Second, require lockbox structures that route borrower payments directly to custodial accounts, eliminating servicer control over cash flow. Third, demand hybrid or backup servicing arrangements with clearly defined transition protocols, including data reconciliation procedures and timeline commitments.
The broader market implication is straightforward: warehouse lenders will tighten advance rates and increase reporting requirements for any originator that also services its own paper. This will raise the cost of capital for legitimate subprime operators while potentially creating opportunities for independent servicers and lenders with robust third-party verification systems already in place.
The institutions that survive the next credit cycle will be those that treated Tricolor as a stress test for their operational governance, not just another headline about subprime risk. Warehouse credit committees should be reviewing servicer concentration risk this quarter, not next year.
1-Minute Video: UCC Filing API: From Blind Lending to Full Financial Visibility
With our UCC Filing Data API, you’ll always know the financial obligations attached to a business.
Get UCC data from 11 states in real time:
Instantly detect existing liens
Identify secured parties and collateral
Improve the quality of your risk analysis
Subscribe to our Beyond Banks Podcast Channels
Headlines You Don’t Want to Miss
The Trump Administration’s reduction-in-force plan has resulted in the elimination of all staff at the CDFI Fund, effectively ceasing its operations and impacting CDFI credit unions and communities nationwide. Credit unions are working to support affected members and stress the urgent need for Congressional action on funding.
Loandepot has filed a lawsuit against West Capital Lending, accusing them of widespread fraud including poaching employees, stealing leads, and misclassifying over 600 loan originators as independent contractors to unlawfully reduce costs and skirt labor laws. The suit also alleges that West Capital Lending unlawfully obtained sensitive customer data, creating significant competitive advantages and causing billions in damages to Loandepot.
Brex announced a partnership with Oracle to become the first fintech issuer embedded within Oracle Fusion Cloud ERP, enabling global enterprises to use Brex virtual cards directly in Oracle’s payables workflows for B2B payments. The collaboration leverages Oracle’s integration with Mastercard to streamline supplier payments across 30+ currencies, automate reconciliation, and enhance financial visibility and control for enterprise customers.
Schedule a FREE Demo Call with Jordan
Get Free Access to our Alternative Finance Disclosure Law Helper GPT
Get Free Access to our Cobalt Modern Underwriter GPT
Get Free Access to our Alternative Funding Expert GPT
Get Free Access to our AI Credit Risk Tool
Create an account to Get Free Access to our Secretary of State AI Tool
![]() | Subscribe on our YouTube Channel here |
See us on LinkedIn |