United Sells Navitas as Charge-Offs Hit Half Its Losses

Navitas was about 10% of United Community's loans and about 50% of its net charge-offs. Wafra is buying the equipment finance book for about $1.9B. That is not a simple exit from risk. It is risk moving to a different owner.

United Community Banks agreed to sell its equipment finance business, Navitas Credit Corp. and NLFC Reinsurance Corp., to funds managed by Wafra for an estimated $1.9 billion in cash.1 The transaction is expected to close in the third quarter of 2026, subject to customary conditions.2

United says Navitas represented about 10% of its total loan portfolio but about 50% of net charge-offs for the twelve months ended March 31, 2026.1 That is the whole story in one ratio. A specialty unit can be small enough to describe as non-core and large enough to dominate the loss conversation.

The estimated price reflects a 7% premium to the par value of Navitas' loan portfolio. United expects a $109 million one-time pre-tax earnings benefit, about 3% tangible book value accretion, and 145 basis points of CET1 capital.1 United also said it expects to reinvest excess liquidity into lower-risk securities at a 4.0% to 4.5% weighted-average yield in the near term.1

Wafra is not buying a nameplate. It is buying an equipment finance platform with $1.8 billion in owned receivables, 207 employees, and six locations as of March 31, 2026.1 Navitas leadership and employees are expected to remain with the business after closing.5

Why is a 10% loan share driving the whole story?

Because concentration is the part of specialty finance that does not show up in a growth headline. United did not say Navitas was unprofitable. It did not say the business could not grow. It said the sale will reduce the risk profile of the loan portfolio because the equipment finance business was about one-tenth of total loans and about half of net charge-offs for the last twelve months.1

That is the operator lesson. A specialty book can produce attractive yield, useful customer reach, and real growth while still becoming too noisy for a regional bank's capital story. The problem is not that the loans are equipment loans. The problem is that losses can concentrate faster than the rest of the balance sheet can absorb politically, operationally, or investor-relations-wise.

For MCA, factoring, revenue-based finance, and equipment finance operators, the read is familiar. Your capital provider may like the yield until one segment starts explaining too much of the loss line. Once that happens, the question shifts from "Can this book grow?" to "Who is the right owner of this risk?" United answered by selling. Wafra answered by buying.

Why would Wafra want what United wants off its balance sheet?

Different owners price the same risk differently. United is a top-100 bank that operates 200 offices across six Southeastern states and manages a nationally recognized SBA lending franchise, mortgage business, wealth management business, and national equipment finance subsidiary.1 A loss-heavy national equipment finance unit can distract from that core-bank story.

Wafra is a global alternative investment manager with about $30 billion in assets under management across alternative assets, including strategic partnerships, real assets and infrastructure, and real estate.1 That buyer can look at Navitas as a specialty-credit platform, not as a drag on a community-bank multiple.

This is not a simple vote against equipment finance. It is a transfer from an owner whose incentive is lower volatility to an owner whose incentive is controlled specialty yield. The same portfolio can be a problem for a bank and an opportunity for an asset manager if the buyer believes the risk can be measured, serviced, priced, and contained.

That is also where the California penalty belongs. The DFPI announced on June 8 that Navitas would pay a $4 million penalty for lending in California without the license required by the California Financing Law.3 The regulator said the matter surfaced when Navitas applied for a California Financing Law license in May 2023, and the review found unlicensed lending, compensation paid to unlicensed brokers, and unlawful interest charged on certain loans.4 United's sale release does not say the DFPI action caused the sale. It does mean a buyer has to underwrite both credit performance and state-by-state operating controls.

What should this change in renewal and forward-flow conversations?

It should move the conversation away from "we grew the book" and toward "we can explain the risk." Growth was not enough to keep Navitas inside United. A $1.9 billion price did not erase the loss concentration. The valuable skill is showing a capital partner exactly where charge-offs come from, what changed, and why the next owner can manage the book better.

That means a renewal package should not start with origination volume. It should start with vintage performance, delinquency migration, loss severity, recoveries, collateral type, broker channel, state exposure, borrower industry, and ticket size. If one bucket is responsible for too much of the loss curve, isolate it before the buyer does. If licensing exposure sits in a few states, show the remediation plan before diligence turns adversarial.

For MCA, factoring, and RBF lenders, the bridge is narrow but useful. This transaction does not tell you your renewal pricing, advance rates, or loss curves. It does tell you that specialty-credit ownership is becoming more deliberate. Banks, warehouse providers, asset managers, securitization buyers, and forward-flow partners all want different proof, but none of them want to discover after diligence that a small segment explains half the damage.

Our Opinion

This is a risk-ownership story, not an equipment finance obituary. A bank can be right to sell a volatile specialty unit, and an asset manager can be right to buy it. Those are different capital models looking at the same collateral.

The 10% versus 50% ratio is the part worth saving. Every specialty lender should know its version of that number. If a segment is small in exposure and large in losses, you do not have a growth story. You have a governance story, and your capital provider will eventually make you tell it.

1-Minute Video: Why Contractor License Pulls Are Non-Negotiable in 2026

Credit bureaus do not report licensing status.

That data only exists on state licensing board portals.

Cobalt Intelligence's Contractor License API directly queries

1 California's CSLB
2 Florida's DBPR
3 New York DOB
4 Texas TDLR

One API call returns license status, expiration dates, and disciplinary actions in 30 to 60 seconds.

Subscribe to our Beyond Banks Podcast Channels

Headlines You Don’t Want to Miss

Fifth Third is reportedly using Provide's platform to consolidate sub-$10 million lending, extending a healthcare-practice fintech acquisition into broader small-business lending infrastructure.8 The history matters: Fifth Third invested in Provide in 2018, began funding loans through the platform in 2020, and acquired the company in 2021 after Provide had originated more than $1 billion in loans since 2016.9 Fifth Third later said Provide technology expanded beyond healthcare in 2024 to power SBA 7(a) origination, and now supports small-business digital lending across the bank's footprint with approvals up to $100,000 in as little as one hour.10 The operator signal is that bank speed is improving where the borrower is bankable, so alternative lenders need sharper segmentation between bankable files, hybrid files, and files only specialist capital can handle.

Oxford Commercial Finance, a subsidiary of Oxford Bank, has secured $275 million in active working-capital facilities for small and mid-sized businesses since launching in 2022.11 The milestone spans 126 transactions across 18 states, with more than $120 million in initial funding, and the portfolio is concentrated in manufacturing at 38%, administrative and staffing services at 22%, and transportation and warehousing at 16%.12 The product set includes asset-based lending, factoring, lines of credit, term loans, and purchase-order financing for businesses that may not fit conventional bank financing.11 The operator signal is that bank-affiliated working-capital platforms are moving into borrower situations that used to feel safely alternative, especially when collateral and receivables can support a lower-cost structure.

Equipment lenders are using agentic AI to improve sales operations, with MAZO Capital Solutions cited as a lender targeting more than a 50% year-over-year increase in annual transactions processed per salesperson.13 The broader equipment-finance technology context is practical: Solifi reports that 63% of equipment-finance respondents identify credit decisioning and scoring as the function most needing technology advancement, 51% point to documentation and funding, and 71% say real-time or instant decisioning is important or critical to customers.14 The caution is governance. Bank regulators are already asking lenders about AI use in lending, KYC, sanctions screening, vendor controls, data protection, and human oversight.15 The operator signal is to automate low-risk workflow drag first, then move slowly as AI gets closer to borrower communication or credit decisions.

Get Free Access to our Cobalt Modern Underwriter GPT

Get Free Access to our Alternative Funding Expert GPT

Get Free Access to our AI Credit Risk Tool

Create an account to Get Free Access to our Secretary of State AI Tool

Subscribe on our YouTube Channel here

See us on LinkedIn

Keep Reading